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Abstract 
Theodor W. Adorno's Anweisungen zum Hören neuer Musik (Guidelines for Listening 
to Modern Music) contain instructions not only for how to listen but also for how to 
have experience in general. The psychological, perceptual, and cognitive structures 
involved are existential structures, i.e. guidelines as to how to be as a modernist or 
post-modern self. Since listening involves abandoning oneself to the immanent logic 
of musical works, it is these works that provide the model for how to be. Adorno's 
work also shows, in contradistinction to some views of Adorno, his commitment to the 
unity of theory and practice and demonstrates that his musical writing is a completely 
independent and novel strand of critical theory because of its attempt to articulate the 
ineffable. However, Adorno's explicit theory of listening ("structural listening") is itself 
inadequate to Adorno's implicit theory of listening as contained in the practice of his 
actual musical writings.  
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A number of years ago TV Guide, which millions of Americans use to 
select which television programs to watch, published a cartoon in which two 
housewives, with their hair in curlers and dressed in housecoats, are sitting and 
watching television.  One housewife says to the other: "The trouble with real life 
is it doesn't have any plot." 
 This cartoon captures something fundamental about the relationship 
between the realities of lived experience on the one hand and culture on the 
other. Culture – every  culture – provides its members with ready-made plots that 
determine or shape how they/we organize, make sense of, and interpret their/our 
"real life". In modernity in particular, this relationship is dialectical, in that 
modern society valorizes individuality, defined as that which goes beyond the 
plots already available, and individually lived lives can have a certain impact on 
these plots, extending, revising, and in certain cases replacing them. At the same 
time, the plot industry of culture, attempts to absorb any transcending, 
innovative, or deviant life into itself. Part of post-modern consciousness is the 
awareness, perhaps even among ordinary people, i.e. people who have never 
heard of post-modernity, of the arbitrary and constructed nature of the plot 
repertoire and of the disjunction between "real life" on the one hand and plots 
on the other.  This disjunction is amplified by the weakening or collapse of "grand 
narratives" – of religious, ideological, or symbolic meaning schemes that served as 
pre-given plots for so many for so long, despite the reactive resurgence of such 
narratives in the world at the present time. In his address for the centenary of 
Mahler's birth, Theodor W. Adorno wrote of the 
perception that the Western idea of unified, internally coherent, as it were 
systematic music, whose unity is meant to be identical with its meaning, is 
no longer viable. It has become incompatible with a situation in which 
people are no longer in command of any authentic experience of such a 
meaning in their lives. It is incompatible with a world which has ceased to 
provide them with the categories of unity in happiness, leaving them only 
with those of standardized compulsion. (1992b, p. 92) 
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In other words, "the trouble with real life is it doesn't have any plot" – or at least 
none that provides, unity, meaning, or happiness. Adorno would surely have 
found of interest, but not surprising, the emergence of "reality television", which 
supposedly portrays "real life", thus pretending to overcome the disjunction 
between the two realms, but only by providing the real life with plots – and ones 
that certainly could be described as "standardized compulsion". 
 A central focus of Adorno's work is the dichotomy and divergence that 
came into existence in the early 20th century between two forces. The first was 
the emergence of the culture industry as one devoted to the production, 
distribution, and inculcation of a repetitive set of manufactured plots – indeed of 
"plotness" – what Adorno refers to as the "always-the-same" (das Immergleiche) 
as the essence of the controlled ideological consciousness that robs individuals of 
freedom. The second was the emergence of modernist art, especially music but 
also literature and painting, as the project of developing, expressing, and 
representing a consciousness that is freed from plots or, to use a recurring term in 
Adorno, from "schemata". The present essay is an expansion and application to 
music-listening – with emphasis on modern music – of Shierry Weber Nicholsen's 
exposition and interpretation of Adorno's aesthetics in her Exact Imagination, Late 
work: On Adorno's Aesthetics, where she writes that 
if his work emphasizes the withering of the capacity for individual 
experience in an administered society that preforms experience – which 
then only seems to be individual subjective experience, in the sense that it 
gives the illusion of a constitutive subjectivity – at the same time, the 
aesthetic dimension of Adorno's work holds out, and indeed is premised on, 
the possibility of a valid, that is "adequate" or "authentic", subjective 
experience. This genuine subjective experience is the correlate of the 
primacy of the object and the condition for non-discursive knowledge of the 
object. (1997, p. 4) 
Authentic or adequate listening to modern music involves precisely genuine 
subjective experience that is the correlate of the primacy of the object and a non-
discursive knowledge of the object. According to Adorno, an authentic work of 
modern music is something entirely individual that has left behind any traditional 
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musical schemata of organization and is organized entirely through a unique set 
of internal relations. In his essay Vers une musique informelle he summarizes this 
idea as a normative model for composers: 
What is meant is a type of music which has discarded all forms which are 
external or abstract or which confront it in an inflexible way. At the same 
time, although such music should be completely free of anything irreducibly 
alien to itself or superimposed on it, it should nevertheless constitute itself in 
an objectively compelling way, in the musical substance itself, and not in 
terms of external laws. Moreover, wherever this can be achieved without 
running the risk of a new form of oppression, such an emancipation should 
also strive to do away with the system of musical co-ordinates which have 
crystallized out in the innermost recesses of the musical substance itself. 
(1992d, p. 272f.) 
Accordingly, to listen to and understand such music requires a corresponding 
form of musical consciousness that has freed itself from or gone beyond these 
schemata and external or abstract forms and is thus, in a way, an individuated 
analogue of the musical work itself. It is worth noting that focusing now on 
Adorno's approach to listening from almost a half-century ago fits within a larger 
order of the present day, namely a recent upsurge in interest in and thinking 
about listening from the perspective of both philosophy (Levin, 1989; Nancy, 2002) 
and musicology with a focus on actual listening processes (Clarke, 2005; Clifton, 
1983; Cook. 1990). This is of course paralleled by a resurgence of interest in Adorno's 
own approach to music (Paddison, 1993; Leppert, 2002; DeNora, 2003). 
 Adorno is often thought of as an analyst, theorist, and critic without 
orientation or commitment to praxis in the traditional Marxist sense and even as 
opposed to it. His colleague Herbert Marcuse once called him "the last great 
bourgeois philosopher" (Marcuse, personal communication, 1964). I have no 
intention here of reviewing the controversies about this. Rather, I want to focus 
on an area where Adorno involved himself acutely in praxis – the practice of 
performing and listening to music. In the preface to Der getreue Korrepetitor: 
Lehrschriften zur musikalischen Praxis ("The faithful coach: instructional writings 
for the practice of music") he writes, 
música em perspect iva                           v.3 n.2, outubro 2010                                  p. 
7-33  
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 11 
in the theory supported by the author, the transition to possible praxis does 
not occur by having the latter having to subordinate itself to theory.  
Precisely through undiluted logic it leads to instructions; at the same time it 
lives from experiences that cannot be obtained except in praxis. (1963b, p. 9) 
In other words, experience is the mediator between theory and practice, is 
essential to the dialectical development of theory and of practice. Adorno's 
commitment to praxis is clear. One of my subsidiary intentions here, even though 
I will not pursue it as a theme in itself, is to rehabilitate Adorno as a critical 
theorist committed to practice and to the integration of theory and practice. 
 In the present paper I will illustrate this primarily with reference to 
Adorno's "Guidelines for Listening to Modern Music" (Anweisungen zum Hőren 
neuer Musik, 1963a) because it is a rich source of concrete material about non-
schematic or post-schematic consciousness and experience. I will also draw on a 
few related essays of Adorno (especially 1963c and1984). In the "Guidelines", 
originally given as a lecture with musical examples, Adorno identifies what he 
considers requisites for listening to modern music. They consist especially of a set of 
dialectical "unities of opposites" that, together, Adorno labels "structural listening" 
(1963a, p. 95; 1963c, p. 34-37), although a number of them are not directly 
related to matters of musical structure in the conventional sense of that term. 
 Prominent among these oppositions are the ability to respond to each 
moment without expectations, but also to perceive how the musical notes in the 
present lead almost inexorably to the new moment; to be simultaneously in a 
state of heightened attention and concentration on the one hand and of surrender 
or self-abandonment to the movement of the music on the other; to listen in a 
way that is enriched by analysis but at the same time consciously oblivious of 
analysis during the listening process; to be both responsive to unconscious and 
chaotic impulses while attuned to highly structured ordering principles; to be fully 
in the present moment but able to link and integrate past, present, and future; to 
be simultaneously naive, with no need of musical expertise, and yet to have what 
some would consider musical sophistication; and to have the listening version of 
the Hegelian "insight [...] that there is no non-identity without identity, nor the 
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latter without the former" (Adorno, 1963a, p. 50f.). While these traits are 
exemplified in terms of musical material, they can also be looked at as a model 
for a new kind of subjectivity that is capable of having authentic experience and 
penetrating the mystifications of false consciousness present in music in particular 
but also in contemporary mass culture in general. 
 I would argue that Adorno's guidelines for listening to modern music 
were important to him because he saw false consciousness in music as a kind of 
glue that held general false consciousness together, such that learning to listen to 
individuated, non-schematic music was a key weapon, as it were, in the struggle 
against false consciousness that has always been a primary focus of both classical 
Marxism and Frankfurt School critical theory. This role of music in false 
consciousness may not have been significant in pre-industrial, pre-mediated 
society, but with the musical saturation of life by the culture-industrial production 
of popular music and its distribution through the mass media, which Adorno 
started to study seriously around 1940 and which intensified and increased 
geometrically during his lifetime and even more so since his death, music has 
become the permanent elevator music and the permanent beat that accompanies 
all of our lives, the cultural amniotic fluid in which we float and which people use 
daily to shape their identities and decorate their life-worlds (DeNora, 2000).  
Hence learning to listen to modern music as a way of having individuated 
experience has only grown in significance in the almost half-century since 
Adorno's lecture and thus lends greater import to his contribution to practice. It is 
why Adorno asserts that "modern music can be considered the bearer of a 
spiritual and moral obligation" (1963a, p. 96). 
 In this paper I am making three primary and three subsidiary claims: 
 The first primary claim is that, because of this key function of music in 
contemporary life and consciousness, Adorno's "Guidelines" have implications 
beyond musical experience itself:  that indeed they can be looked at as guidelines 
for how to perceive or how to have experience in general. For the psychological, 
perceptual, and cognitive structures involved in listening to modern music are 
general characteristics of broader application. 
música em perspect iva                           v.3 n.2, outubro 2010                                  p. 
7-33  
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 13 
 The second primary claim is that these mental and experiential structures 
are not merely about perceiving or experiencing but are really existential 
structures – that is, I would argue, Adorno's guidelines for listening are not merely 
guidelines for perceiving or interpreting but also guidelines as to how to be. It is 
striking that the language Adorno uses to describe listening includes such terms or 
phrases as "being in the music" (1963a, p. 39), which designate not 
psychoauditory traits but existential ones. Since Adorno wrote in Minima Moralia 
(1951) that the subject has been liquidated, his guide to listening is in effect a 
guide to how be a subject when the subject has already been liquidated, as 
suggested by Nicholsen's words, quoted above, about the possibility of valid 
subjective experience. 
 The third primary claim is that, since listening involves abandoning 
oneself to the immanent logic of musical works, it is ultimately these works 
themselves that are really the guide to how to be – if one knows how to listen to 
them. As Adorno writes, "The more organized and integrated the music, the more 
rigorously it relates all of its elements to one another, the more it integrates the 
listener, the less it leaves him out" (1963a, p. 41). This appeal to musical works as 
themselves providing integration or identity for the listener is in keeping with the 
key theme of Adorno's later work, der Vorrang des Objekts, the primacy of the 
object, as a reversal of and protest against the dominating subject of repressive 
Western civilization (Adorno, 1970). 
 The subsidiary claims are about Adorno's work itself. The first is the one I 
have already introduced about Adorno's commitment to the unity of theory and 
practice, with the transformation of musical experience, and aesthetic experience 
more generally, as its focus. The second, which I shall discuss below, is that 
Adorno's musical writing is a completely independent and novel strand of critical 
theory whose theoretical status has not been clearly recognized. The third, which I 
shall adumbrate in the concluding section, is that Adorno's explicit theory of 
structural listening does not adequately account for Adorno's implicit theory of 
listening as contained in the practice of his actual musical writings. For it captures 
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only one or two dimensions of a much more multidimensional approach for 
which "structural" is not the most apt term. 
 Why should music be such an important example of the primacy of the 
object? Perhaps in no other domain does this notion arise as distinctively and as 
poignantly as in that of music, because in an emphatic sense, despite certain 
similarities between music and language that Adorno discusses in his brief essay 
on their relationship, music is in a strict sense so far beyond language, outside of 
language, "other" to and other than language, that it can stand as the 
paradigmatic case of that which transcends the subjectivity that is manifested in 
language (which can be roughly equated to the realm of the conscious in a 
psychoanalytic sense). Of course music does this in a metaphysically ironic 
sense, because "music resembles a language" (1992c, p. 1) and is at the same 
time, through and through, subjectivity, even though at the same time it is 
outside of and resistant to language. So music is both subject and object, both 
language and non-language. This is central to Adorno's statement that "works of 
art are the only things-in-themselves" (1963c, p. 38). In this he goes even beyond 
Schopenhauer, who, while maintaining that music "represents the metaphysical in 
relation to everything physical in the world, the thing-in-itself in relation to all 
appearance" (Schopenhauer, 1859, p. 353), nevertheless claimed only that music 
represents the thing-in-itself, not that music itself possesses that status. As Adorno 
says of the meaning of music, it "is not to be understood as something 
represented by the music or expressed by it: it has absolutely no existence 
independently of the music but is rather, again according to Schoenberg, 
something that can be said only through music" (1984, p. 689). This means that 
all writing about and analysis of music is afflicted with paradox, self-
contradiction, self-negation, and indirection, since it tries to say something in 
words that in fact can be said only through music. 
 The ineffability of music is not only a fundamental issue in the 
philosophy of music but, if music has meaning, arguably raises important issues 
for the philosophy of language and meaning, with both epistemological and 
ontological implications. Stated most simply, it seems obvious that music has 
música em perspect iva                           v.3 n.2, outubro 2010                                  p. 
7-33  
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 15 
meaning: but no-one can say exactly what it is, or agree on what it is. It does not 
denote anything. It has been treated as meaningful in its own terms not only by 
Adorno but also by such philosophers of music as Suzanne Langer, Vladimir 
Jankélévitch and Laird Addis (Addis, 1999; Jankélévitch, 2003; Langer, 1953). As 
far as I know, the issue of ineffability and its place in the relation of music and 
language was first most profoundly articulated in the modern period by 
Mendelssohn, who complained that words 
seem to me so ambiguous, so indefinite, and so easily misunderstood in 
comparison with genuine music, which fills the soul with a thousand things 
better than words. The thoughts which are expressed to me by a piece of 
music that I love are not too indefinite to be put into words, but on the 
contrary too definite. (Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 1878, p. 221) 
The non-linguistic, non-conceptual character of music highlights the importance of 
the effort nevertheless made by Adorno to undertake the Hegelian "exertion of 
the concept" in being able to say something insightful and instructive about what 
is unsayable. A critical theory that could not speak meaningfully and in depth 
about music, about the unsayable, would not be a complete critical theory – 
certainly not one that could account fully for the different forms of consciousness, 
both true and false, both conscious and unconscious. 
 Indeed in this way Adorno's musical work can be understood as a radical, 
qualitatively different complement and parallel to the incorporation of the 
psychoanalytic dimension into critical theory. On the one hand, both attempt to 
explain and interpret meanings that are unconscious and that help explain such 
sociopolitical phenomena as fascism, the authoritarian personality, and the 
liquidation of individuality. On the other hand, at least from the Freudian 
perspective that has been central to critical theory, the unconscious consists of 
meanings that have been repressed and become inaccessible to awareness and 
linguistic formulation but are in principle capable of recovery and linguistic 
formulation, either through clinical psychoanalytic processes or through 
theoretical interpretations. As we know, Habermas's use of psychoanalysis as 
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paradigmatic for critical knowledge is based on the model of the linguistic 
banishment and re-appropriation of meanings – replacing private meanings and 
symbols with public language (Habermas, 1971). But, as we have seen, the 
meanings manifested in music are in principle incapable of linguistic translation 
and direct linguistic formulation. Thus Adorno's music-analytical oeuvre 
represents a fundamentally different theoretical and practical strategy than the 
psychoanalytic, attempting, as it does, to recuperate for critical theory the realm 
of the ineffable, both conscious and unconscious, with implications for both 
theory and practice. Whereas critical theory is sometimes thought of as captured 
in the equation "critical theory = Marx + Weber + Freud + Nietzsche", 
Adorno's work shows that a more accurate equation would be something like 
"critical theory = Marx + Weber + Freud + Nietzsche + x", where the x could 
be understood to stand for the stream of thought from Mendelssohn to 
Schoenberg and Adorno (and continued by Jankélévitch and others) that 
highlights the ineffability and centrality of music and the ineffable in experience 
in general. Nietzsche himself, incidentally, also asserted that the meaning of 
music was ineffable, but that is not the usual context in which he is considered 
tributary to the Frankfurt School. 
 In Exact Imagination, Late Work, Nicholsen defends Adorno precisely on 
these grounds against Habermas's and Wellmer's critique of him from the 
perspective of a communication theory of society. As she writes, "Adorno's work 
transcends Wellmer's attempted Habermasian reconstruction precisely because 
that reconstruction relies on a premature equation of the subjective with the 
linguistic or communicative" (1997, p. 6). It should be noted as well that in this 
regard Adorno's thinking intersects with current research from an evolutionary 
perspective about the origins of and relation between music and language. Thus 
some contemporary scholars advance the theory (which originates with Rousseau, 
1996 [1781]) that music and language are separate, specialized evolutionary 
branches that derive from a common root, a "musilanguage" that preceded them 
(Brown, 2000), and that music is as constitutive of humanness as language 
(Mithen, 2005; Wallin, Merker and Brown, 2000). Most of those working within 
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this approach think of music as something that conveys or represents emotion and 
promotes social bonding and of language as something that conveys or represents 
information, although the representation of emotion is sometimes conceived in a 
rather limited sense that does not account for the almost infinite variety and 
specificity of what is conveyed by musical works, which exceed by far any 
recognized repertoire of emotions. Addis certainly has a more adequate and fine-
grained theory, asserting that music represents emotions, moods, sensations, and 
"possible states of consciousness", including "moods, emotions, and other frames 
of mind that, as far as we know, have never been experienced or even conceived" 
(1999, p. 78). But this re-evaluation of the role of music in society undermines the 
social science truism of past generations that language and tool-making alone are 
the differentia specifica of homo sapiens. It may require that the communication 
theory of society be replaced by or supplemented with a musical one. 
 The affliction by paradox and self-contradiction of writing or talking 
about the ineffable in music also explains why the intellectual effort of doing so 
has a kinship with  mysticism in its attempt to conjure a unity with the ineffable: 
in Adorno's mystical description, 
The language of music is quite different from the language of intentionality. 
It contains a theological dimension. What it has to say is simultaneously 
revealed and concealed. Its Idea is the divine Name which has been given 
shape. It is demythologized prayer, rid of efficacious magic. It is the human 
attempt, doomed as ever, to name the Name, not to communicate 
meanings. (1992c, p. 2) 
 Indeed, Adorno asserts that it has been impossible to discover what music 
authentically is. Thus writing about music may involve conceptual articulation, but 
it can do so fruitfully only in combination with two other strategies. The first is 
pointing to that in the music which is beyond such articulation, i.e. through 
"ostensive definition." That is why, for example, when Adorno wants to "explain" 
and demonstrate this unsayable musical meaningfulness, he does so by playing 
music (in a lecture with piano), that is by playing the same musical phrase from 
Bach twice, once unphrased and unarticulated and once with phrasing and 
J. J. SHAPIRO                                                      Adorno´s Praxis of Individuation Through Music Listening  
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18	  
articulation. "Only the second time will it be meaningful" (1984, p. 689). The 
proof will be in the hearing, not in a proposition about it. As Adorno writes in his 
essay on music and language, "to interpret language means: to understand 
language. To interpret music means: to make music" (1992c, p. 3). 
 Adorno's second strategy is the use of figurative language, as Nicholsen 
has emphasized in her work: the use of images, metaphors, and associations, to 
capture the essence of that which cannot be defined conceptually (1997, p. 26). 
This may be linked to the intimate relationship between music and metaphor: it 
has been argued that, in the context of the evolutionary emergence of the human 
species, "music [...] can sustain the emergence of a metaphorical domain, acting 
to create and maintain the cognitive flexibility that appears to be the hallmark of 
our species" (Cross, 2003, p. 27). Since the use of figurative language is an 
attempt to capture the ineffable, then, once we have recognized that capturing 
the ineffable is essential to critical theory, we can see that figurative language is 
not a mere personal style of Adorno but rather is essential to critical theory per 
se. Stated in other terms, a hermeneutic of imagination and indirection is inherent 
in critical theory to the extent that it attempts to penetrate to the pre-, non-, sub-, 
and extra-linguistic dimensions of human experience and society (see also 
Kramer, 2003). For those who are not directly familiar with Adorno's use of 
figurative language in the description of music, I cite a lengthy but rich example 
from his comments on Der Abschied ("The Parting"), the last movement of Das 
Lied von der Erde ("The Song of the Earth") in his book about Mahler: 
To the work [The Song of the Earth] the earth is not the universe, but what 
fifty years later could fall within the experience of one flying at a great 
altitude, a star. For the gaze of music that leaves it behind, it is rounded to a 
sphere that can be overviewed, as in the meantime it has already been 
photographed from space, not the center of Creation but something minute 
and ephemeral. To such experience is allied the melancholy hope for other 
stars, inhabited by happier beings than humans. But the earth that has 
grown remote to itself is without the hope the stars once promised. It is 
sinking into empty galaxies. On it lies beauty as the reflection of past hope, 
which fills the dying eye until it is frozen below the flakes of unbound space. 
The moment of delight before such beauty dares to withstand its 
abandonment to disenchanted nature. That metaphysics that is no longer 
possible becomes the ultimate metaphysics. (1992a, p. 154) 
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 I emphasize the paradox of writing about the ineffable in order to frame 
Adorno's project of using language to make modern music understandable and 
point to its inherent difficulties and limitations, which is one of several reasons 
that the concluding paragraph of Adorno's "Guidelines"  begins, "Admittedly, the 
value of all these suggestions is questionable" (1963a, p. 97). As I have already 
suggested, it is because of this resistance of music to being grasped linguistically 
that it can serve as a model for thinking about how to perceive and how to have 
experience in general: precisely because it is a limiting case, it can stand for all 
that in lived experience which is below the threshold of linguistic and 
conceptual unrepeatability. But since much of our life is at that level – more 
than we usually can acknowledge to ourselves and to others – it seems worth 
pursuing the idea that learning to listen to modern music can be a vehicle for 
learning to listen both to ourselves as modern/post-modern individuals and to the 
modern/post-modern world that we inhabit – as well as to the music, culture, and 
experience of the past. 
 That Adorno conceived the appropriate way to listen to modern music as 
of broader extension, as not just some limited, technical way of providing access 
to the avant-garde, can be seen in his very strong claim "that every piece of music 
since the beginning of the common practice period (Generalbasszeitalter) [in 
other words, since the mid-17th century – JJS] should be listened to as though it 
were modern" (1963c, p. 35). That is because, despite being composed within 
traditional schemata, the great works of traditional classical music were already, 
in themselves, underneath these very schemata, although often in a concealed 
way, organized entirely through a unique set of internal relations, or, to use 
Adorno's words quoted above, "constituted [...] in an objectively compelling way, 
in the musical substance itself, and not in terms of external laws." This internal 
tension or contradiction between internal formal organization and the schematic 
shell that houses it is central to both Adorno's aesthetic conception and his own 
aesthetic perception and is what he denotes with the term "the subcutaneous", a 
term that he himself attributes to Schoenberg: "I believe that this concept of 
subcutaneous form holds for all music of true greatness in all of its aspects" 
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(1984, p. 688). And "you have only understood [a traditional musical work] 
when you succeed in pursuing and knowing in detail what actually unfolds 
musically beneath [the schemata] [...]. Only then have you heard what is 
concretely happening in the music" (1984, p. 688).   
 What has happened in modern music "is in truth only that the 
subcutaneous, i.e. the fabric of individual musical events as the bearer of a 
unified meaning, breaks through the surface, becomes visible, and asserts itself 
free of any schema. The inner becomes outer" (1984, p. 690) – a formulation 
that recalls the self-transformation and reconstruction of the subject in 
psychoanalysis. But it is only the transformation of perception involved in 
listening to modern music that makes it possible to truly and authentically listen 
to – to hear what is occurring in – its forebear, traditional music: to hear, for 
example, as Adorno tries to show, that Beethoven and Schoenberg used similar 
principles of organization (1984, p. 691-693). 
 These ultimately Hegelian conceptualizations, according to which what 
existed "in essence" finds its true, fully self-reflective and conscious form only in 
"the concept", that dialectical thought moves from the "abstract" (schematic) to 
the "concrete" (internally self-organized), and that history can thus only be 
understood backwards should now make clear the intent of the present argument. 
If music is indeed the glue that holds together false consciousness, and learning to 
listen to modern music is what enables the true understanding not only of 
contemporary music but of the music of the past, then it is also of strategic 
importance in attempting to arrive at a truer consciousness in the broadest sense. 
Learning to hear, to perceive, to understand the subcutaneous is an essential part 
of a dialectical approach that integrates theory, practice, and experience. In other 
words, learning to listen to and understand modern music is, as suggested earlier, 
not merely about expanding one's realm of musical enjoyment – it is also about 
developing a truer and deeper and more critical understanding of self and society. 
It is not enough to be able to think critically; one must also be able to experience 
critically, and thus to listen critically. Indeed, in this view, only if one can listen 
critically can one fully think critically. This does not mean, it should be added, 
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that the deaf cannot experience or think critically, since the distinctions and 
analyses that Adorno puts forth apply in other aesthetic domains. Indeed, at 
one point he goes so far as to say that, because the arts are drawing closer to 
one another, "it could be proposed that one should listen to modern music the 
way one looks at a painting as a whole, grasping all its aspects at once" (1963b, 
p. 96). But as a temporal art, music is paradigmatic for consciousness in general. 
The temporal isomorphism between sound and consciousness is Addis's 
fundamental argument for music's ability to represent states of possible 
consciousness (1999, p. 66-69). 
 In the present context I will focus on just a few of the characteristics that 
Adorno highlights as essential to listening to modern music but that have 
implications for experiencing and thinking critically in general. 
 The first, in line with the notion of the primacy of the object, is about 
escaping from the constraints imposed by the rigidities of one's own subjectivity 
by giving oneself over to, perceiving, experiencing, and understanding the 
object itself. Here are some typical formulations: "the listener must completely 
abandon himself to what comes next. He cannot simply draw analogies to what 
he has already heard" (1963a, p. 45). "The logic of events speaks purely for 
itself" (p. 45). Listening involves "pure surrender to what is occurring in the 
music" (p. 53), hearing "where the sound itself, i.e. where each note that it 
contains, wants to go" (p. 55). "Entering into music and actively following it in its 
course means succeeding in the subject's abandoning itself to something that 
thereby becomes its own: anticipation of a state in which alienation has been 
eliminated" (1963c, p. 38). In other words, taken to the limit, adequate or correct 
or appropriate listening is an aesthetic orientation that, through transcending 
the subject toward the object and trying to follow the object in its own contours 
and configuration tends toward utopia. Thus someone who learns to listen to 
modern music is preparing herself or himself to understand reality as it really is, 
and this aesthetic education, as Schiller indicated so long ago, is thus also a kind 
of political education. 
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 The second characteristic has to do with the configuration or structure of 
reality itself. Adorno argues for the need for "the most intense concentration 
while listening" on the grounds that in modern music "everything is of equal 
importance, equally close to the center. Because nothing is external or accidental 
to the constitution of musical meaning, everything must be drawn into the field of 
attention, if the musical meaning is not to be missed" (1963a, p. 92f.). Thus the 
surrender of the self to the object is not to be a vague romantic swimming in an 
ocean of feeling but rather requires a precision and complexity corresponding to 
the precision and complexity that exists in the object. Adorno reminds us that in 
the great and paradigmatic works of modern music, the different, separable 
dimensions according to which music is traditionally conceived – melody, 
harmony, rhythm, timbre, texture, etc. – no longer exist as separate dimensions: 
"in the most sublime musical style of the present, that of Anton Webern, 
relations between color, texture, and the most minute motifs function to 
constitute the form" (1963a, p. 93). So the listener must achieve "a kind of 
synthesis of the most diverse elements and musical dimensions [corresponding] 
to the integration that occurs in composing itself" (p. 93). In other words, 
Adorno is proposing a new sort of synthesis in the subject that is required by 
the nature of the modern object: clearly the musical object, but, I would argue, 
also the modern object in general. 
 Two other aspects of the configuration or constitution of the object also 
enter into the kind of mixture of receptivity and synthesis required of the subject: 
the structure of time and the relation between instinct and chaos on the one hand 
and the order of formal construction on the other. With regard to time, the modern 
music of which Adorno speaks dispenses with repetition and is organized through 
the principle of "radical variation", which requires "recognizing the non-identical as 
nevertheless identical" (1963a, p. 51) and a new way of linking and synthesizing 
the past, present, and future: "[filling] out this spontaneous hearing of what is 
happening from moment to moment with something that incorporates both the 
past and the present [...] One must make some effort to listen backwards" (p. 52). 
 With regard to instinct and chaos, Adorno points out that  
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the more that modern music abandons itself to unfettered instinctual 
impulses, the more it tends toward that intertwined, even chaotic state, 
then, if it is not to descend into a pre-artistic state, [it] requires organizing 
counterforces and conjures up out of itself the subtlest methods of formal 
construction [...] This can be grasped only by a musical consciousness that 
can keep up with the reciprocal interaction of these two aspects: that can be 
cognizant of the presence of instinctual impulse in formal construction and 
of the latter in the former. (1963a, p. 92) 
 This requires a differently structured consciousness than that of the entire 
Western tradition, which sees order on the one hand and chaos and instinct on 
the other as warring forces in a battle that can lead only to either domination by 
the subject or the subversion or annihilation of the subject. It also hearkens to the 
sort of restructuring of consciousness that occurs in psychoanalysis. 
 Taken together, Adorno's guidelines for listening hold out a model of 
experience, cognition, and action that bears more detailed exploration. The 
subject that can synthesize these elements and dimensions is not a traditional 
subject that has learned a new form of "music appreciation," a concept that 
Adorno detested and critiqued as part of musical commodity fetishism and the 
regression of listening (Adorno, 1963c), but rather a new subject whose identity is 
of a new type – as I suggested at the beginning – a type that can be gleaned from 
the structure of modern musical works themselves. To work out this new subject 
with any concreteness would require an important detour that would take us 
beyond the limits of the present paper: an exploration of the structures of 
subjectivity that both underlie and are created by the major composers of pre-
”modern” classical music: especially Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven, but also 
Wagner and Mahler. To understand the way in which works of modern music 
prefigure a new, non-schematic listener, we would have to first be somewhat 
clear both about the alienated consciousness of the contemporary listener that has 
been investigated so richly by Adorno as well as about the normative, ideally 
normal, "mature" listener. 
 There is a tendency among thinkers within the Marxian tradition, even 
those who have transcended the old dogmatic base/superstructure model, to 
assume that artistic creations and phenomena reflect forces within their 
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sociohistorical context (despite great differences in how this relationship is 
conceived). Yet some other writers have suggested a different relationship, one in 
which it is first in art that forms and structures are worked out that only later, 
sometimes much later, come to predominate or even play a significant role in the 
surrounding culture and society, and this model is particularly relevant to 
Adorno's ideas about music listening as a kind of constitutive praxis. Herbert Read 
looks at the history of visual art as one in which artists take unconscious and 
preconscious material that exists within themselves and their fellow human beings 
and give it specific and graspable form which then becomes humanly accessible 
and eventually even sometimes commonplace (Read, 1965).. A related claim is 
that of Harold Bloom, who asserts that 
personality, in our sense, is a Shakespearean invention and is not only  
Shakespeare's greatest originality but also the cause of his perpetual 
pervasiveness.  Insofar as we ourselves value, and deplore, our own 
personalities, we are the heirs of Falstaff and of Hamlet [...] (Bloom, 
1998, p. 4). 
Bloom argues that it is really Shakespeare who invented what has come in the 
modern era to be thought of as the human – that the human psyche that is 
normative for modern culture is really Shakespeare's creation. It is possible to 
make such claims without being a complete idealist. A “materialist” version of this 
idea would be that certain emerging social processes and their implications are 
grasped in statu nascendi by the artist, writer, or composer and crystallized in 
forms that come to shape social life and human identity or personality. This 
indeed was Horkheimer's strategy in looking for precursors and prototypes of 
fascism in bourgeois social movements of the late Middle Ages and early modern 
period, or Horkheimer's and Adorno's in looking at Odysseus as prototype of the 
modern bourgeois. Indeed, I would argue that one can derive from Adorno's 
work the case that Beethoven is constitutive of the form of the modern bourgeois 
self. As Adorno writes, "Humanity in his [Beethoven's] work means: you should 
behave as this music behaves. It shows how to lead a life which is active, 
outwardly productive without being narrow – a life of solidarity" (1998, p.8).  
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Analogously, his analysis of Schoenberg, Berg, and Webern leads to a normative 
construction of the modernist, post-modern identity. 
 One way to pursue this connection between musical structure and the 
structure of the self would be to explore concretely, with musical examples, the 
relationship between four things that are central to Adorno's thought about 
listening to modern music: the integration of past, present, and future in listening; 
the ability to hear identity in non-identity and vice versa; radical variation as the 
core technique of modern music; and the construction of personal identity. One 
could trace the evolution of musical variation from Bach and Mozart, through 
Beethoven, then Brahms, Elgar, and Mahler, and finally to Schoenberg and 
Webern, to demonstrate the assumptions contained in each of those composers' 
works – especially those that explicitly focus on theme and variations – about 
what constitutes identity. One would follow the gradual loosening of the structure 
of identity and of what counts as and is experienced as repetition, what as 
variation, and what as the underlying identity of the increasingly deviant and 
non-identical to the point of "radical variation", and what each means for the 
subjectivity and identity of the listening individual. One would hear the gradual 
disintegration and evaporation of the schemata and the surfacing of the 
subcutaneous – and accompanying that the disappearance of the work done for 
the listener by the schemata and, in consequence, the increasing demand on the 
listener to actively abandon herself to the immanent logic of the variation process 
in order to make the identity occur through, as Adorno says (explicitly using and 
referring to Kant's terminology in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories 
in the Critique of Pure Reason), "a synthesis not through 'recognition in the 
concept' but rather through the simultaneously active and involuntary 
'reproduction in the imagination'" (1963c, p. 36f.). 
 It seems quite significant in this context that Adorno refers back to these 
concepts from the first edition of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, because there 
(A 100-102) Kant establishes a clear link between the synthetic unity that occurs 
in appearances and the synthetic unity of the self. In the section on "The Synthesis 
of Reproduction in Imagination," Kant argues that "experience as such necessarily 
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presupposes the reproducibility of appearances" (Kant, 1933[1781], p. 133). 
Kant points out that if I did not retain and reproduce in my single, unitary 
consciousness the previous representations in time of an object of experience 
while advancing to the subsequent representations, I would never obtain a 
complete representation, i.e. I would never experience it as an object. The 
connection to Adorno's statements about being able to connect the past and 
present in musical experience is obvious. In other words, for the listener to 
modern music, identity is not something given but something achieved only 
through active imaginative synthesis. The more that variations vary from the 
theme – the more "radical", in Adorno's language, variation becomes – the more 
active work is required to construct and maintain the identity, and this can be 
taken as paradigmatic for the conditions of personal identity in general in the 
contemporary world. In Adorno's words, 
[modern music], too, does not fully dispense with the means of similarity, 
repetition, and identity. In so doing, it adapts to the insight of philosophy 
[Adorno really means here Hegel's Science of Logic, especially the section 
on "Essence" – JJS] that there is no non-identity without identity, nor the 
latter without the former. But in this music what is repeated, the identical, 
through its pure development also remains at the same time the non-
identical. Stated in musical, technical terms, its central technique is that of 
radical variation, even in – precisely in – the repetitions. The irrevocably 
returning sameness must always differentiate itself from its original form. 
(1963a, p. 50-51) 
 To take a few well-known musical examples, in Mozart's piano Variations 
on "Ah, vous dirais-je, Maman" (K. 265) the familiar nursery tune can be heard 
distinctly in almost every variation, as pure repetition, with the same notes and 
the same chords in the same or only slightly differing rhythm: with few 
exceptions, variation consists primarily of ornamentation laid on top of the tune. 
By contrast, it is possible, on first acquaintance, to listen to the last movement of 
Beethoven's Sonata in E major, op. 109 and hear the variations as separate pieces 
without hearing any identity or repetition whatsoever.  Increasing immersion in 
the piece, however, with the active attention of which Adorno speaks, will make 
the identity shine through the apparent non-identity of the variations. Whether 
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this occurs through intellectual reflection or through unconscious attention and 
receptivity, it manifests itself primarily in increasing perception of the work's 
beauty, integrity, and inner evolution. With Elgar's Enigma Variations for 
orchestra, there has been a century-long controversy about what the actual theme 
is that underlies the variations. That is, what unifies the variations is an underlying 
"essence" that is never directly stated. And when Webern guided the rehearsal of 
his Variations for Piano op. 27 by a pianist who kept on asking him to explain the 
underlying tone row on which the piece was based so that he could better 
understand it and therefore perform it better, Webern refused to tell him and 
forbade him to think about it, saying that it was irrelevant to the performance, 
which should be done in purely musical terms with a musician's intuition. Indeed 
a listener can move through a sheer act of attention and will from the state of not 
hearing the Webern piece as a set of variations at all to hearing all of it as 
variations. Adorno in his "Guidelines" examines in detail a particular instance of 
variation in one of Schoenberg's Five Pieces for Orchestra op. 16, to show the 
gradual transmutation of a pattern into something that is different but yet 
preserves a kind of continuity with the original pattern (1963a, p. 57-59). 
Inversely, in Morton Feldman's Coptic Light, what presents itself seems at first like 
pure repetition, like a passacaglia theme repeated over and over again, i.e. as 
pure identity, until, upon closer listening, the identity reveals itself as a fabric of 
subtle kaleidoscopic variation, as though identity studied under a microscope 
dissolved into a Brownian movement of consciousness. 
 It would be instructive, at the opposite end of the spectrum, to compare 
such subtle transmutation with the beat of much current popular music, where 
identity is maintained primarily through the simple repetition of a drum beat on 
every beat of every measure of a song, in such a way that everything on top of 
that beat is implicitly defined by it as, in essence, inessential – as though identity 
had swallowed up or drowned out any non-identity in the melody or the chord 
changes. For if they had substance, in the philosophical sense, they would not 
need an explicitly sounding beat behind them to constitute their inner coherence 
and identity. The agenda of this music is the beat. Indeed, the percussion blow on 
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every beat is the purest musical expression of Adorno's "always the same" (das 
Immergleiche). This is underlined by the fact that the ability to maintain a beat 
seems to be a fundamental, species-specific competence of the human brain that 
differentiates human music from music-like characteristics of other animals: "the 
existence of measured music – music subject to an isochronous temporal pulse – 
constitutes a quasi-universal" (Arom, 2000; see also Peretz and Hyde, 2003). In 
other words, human beings can hear and maintain a beat spontaneously, without 
it being literally spelled out for them. Indeed, much music lives from the interplay 
between the background, unplayed beat and the music's own rhythmic patterns. 
In the words of Anders Friberg and Johan Sundberg, "deviations [from the 
official] are an important part of musical expressivity" (1995, p. 2524). The 
constant playing of the beat eliminates such deviations and such interplay. 
 From such musical analyses we could then reflect on the evolution of 
types of personal identity and subjectivity, and see what we could learn from 
Adorno's "Guidelines" about ways to be and to not be, options for the 
constitution of meaningful subjectivity or identity, and what directions we would 
choose for ourselves to have maximally meaningful lives in a world that has 
ceased to provide us with the categories of unity in happiness. 
 I mentioned in my presentation of subsidiary claims that Adorno's 
explicit theory of listening, which he terms "structural listening", is itself 
inadequate to his implicit theory of listening as contained in the practice of his 
actual musical writings or its presuppositions. For it captures only one or two 
dimensions of a much more multidimensional approach for which "structural" is 
not the most apt term: an approach that is clearly manifested in his own way of 
listening to and experiencing music. In a way, one can make of Adorno's analyses 
the same sort of reproach that Hegel made of Kant, namely that Kant could not 
account for his own theory by means of his theory and that a higher-level, more 
reflective kind of theory was necessary in order to do so. I call attention to this 
because ultimately one would need such a higher level, self-reflective, multi-
dimensional theory of music listening and of musical analysis in order to bring to 
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fulfillment what is clearly Adorno's ultimate intention in his musical work, as 
manifested  in his most concrete and fully worked out musical analyses. 
 For example, in the "Guidelines", a fair amount of the actual musical 
analysis consists of motivic analysis, showing how musical motifs are either 
elaborated, varied, or broken down into their component parts. It is true that 
Adorno often uses such motivic analysis to move to a more phenomenological 
description of the music so analyzed, as when he shows how Berg produces a 
sense of temporal stagnation or quiescence through the breaking down of the initial 
motif of a string quartet movement into its component parts. At the same time, 
some of Adorno's true greatness as a listener who is also an analyst, theorist, and 
historian is expressed in metaphorical descriptions that are not even explained in 
terms of such motivic analysis, as represented, for example, in his already quoted 
description of the last movement of the Das Lied von der Erde as providing a view 
of the earth in its smallness like that seen by astronauts from space. 
 Perhaps Adorno's greatest gift was indeed the way in which he listened to 
music, which underlay not only his many and important musical writings but can 
be argued to have been an important basis of his philosophy of history and 
theory of society in general. His interpretations of music are not the result of the 
application to music of an external body of theory. Rather they are a way of 
hearing and experiencing the music, into which of course theory had entered and 
with which it has been mediated. And this way of hearing and experiencing music 
was also for Adorno a way of disclosing the world. Indeed, his ability to articulate 
truth about society, history, and humanity can be seen as an extension of his 
ability to formulate what a piece of music is, the truth about music. And it is not 
surprising that the available music-analytic and music-hermeneutic tools, 
concepts, and schemata available to him were not adequate to his own way of 
hearing. Indeed, his expositions about music listening – such as his description of 
"structural hearing" or his typology of listeners in his Introduction to the Sociology 
of Music (Adorno, 1988) are remarkably impoverished, ahistorical, and 
undialectical compared to the subtlety and complexity of his own way of hearing, 
which does not at all fit into such categories as structural hearing or "expert 
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listener". Indeed, the "expert listener" that Adorno appears to define as 
normative and paradigmatic in the sociology of music book seems almost devoid 
of experience and rather like something that could be instantiated by a computer 
program. The category is defined primarily in technical, not aesthetic or 
experiential terms. Without focusing on hearing per se, Max Paddison makes the 
parallel point that Adorno's theory of music and musical history is not adequate 
to his own analyses (Paddison, 1993). 
 But it is possible to identify and abstract features of Adorno's hearing 
from his varied writing and comments about music in general and specific pieces 
of music. And this is an urgent task, for two related reasons. First, to resist the 
fetishism of music, the regression of hearing, and the power of the cultural 
industry to produce a schematic, repetitive, one-dimensional experience, it is not 
enough to provide it with an intellectual critique. This does not transmit the 
ability to hear to those who do not already possess it and who need it. Rather it is 
important to set against these forces an actual model of hearing and listening to 
music that is experientially rich, dialectically complex, and personally forceful – a 
model that can actually help people hear authentic music and hear music 
authentically, although it is important to consider whether this model is historically 
viable at present. Second, this is precisely the area where Adorno is our greatest 
potential teacher, if we know what it is that we can learn from him. It would be 
wasteful of the resources of Adorno and the critical tradition not to learn what he 
can teach us as an experiential mentor and not just as a formulator of theory. 
 Some of Adorno's characteristics as a listener were his ability to hear 
simultaneously the total structure and each particular moment; to hear 
historically, hearing the piece as mediated by its context and the universality in 
that context; to hear the potentialities inherent in the music of a particular time, 
hearing the difference between, for example, the progressive and reactionary 
options historically available; to hear the dialectical mediation of the ideal on the 
one hand and the material, emotional, biological, subcutaneous on the other; to 
hear literally and metaphorically at the same time, and to be able to articulate the 
meanings in language; to know how to draw on one's own private associations 
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and experiences and either make them universal or find what's universal in them, 
rather than dissolving the music into those associations and experiences; to hear 
redemptively (which also means compassionately); to hear the dialectic between 
formal features of music, e.g. harmonic structures, and material-historical-
expressive features; to hear with the Hegelian method of "reines Zusehen" ("pure 
seeing" or "pure looking at"), which unfolds what is really there rather than 
bringing something to it from the outside; to hear in terms of the messianic 
history of culture that he shares with Benjamin and Marcuse, of experiencing and 
understanding the uniqueness of each historical moment and how these moments 
structure the culture that surrounds them and rise out of them. Each of these 
aspects would need to be developed more explicitly, and with examples, in 
another context. Developing a model of how Adorno heard music would also be 
useful beyond the domain of music itself, in the whole arena of developing a 
more fertile interaction between dialectical experience and dialectical thinking. 
 Articulating how Adorno heard or listened to music would be a fitting 
way to render homage to him in a way that acknowledged and paid tribute to 
something that was as much a highly personal, individual gift as an intellectual 
and cultural resource. It would be paying attention to his own "subcutaneous" 
sphere of life and his own individuation as a person. 
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